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DO BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTH AFRICAN RETIREMENT FUNDS OWE 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO BOTH THE FUNDS AND FUND MEMBERS? THE 
DEBATE CONTINUES 
  
MC Marumoagae 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Section 7C(2) of the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 
'PFA') outlines the general duties of the boards of retirement funds. Over the years 
there has been much debate in the retirement fund industry as to to whom the board, 
as the managing body of the retirement fund, is accountable.1 However, South 
African courts and tribunals adjudicating pension fund-related disputes and the 
retirement industry at large seem to share the view that the board of trustees is 
accountable to both the fund and its members,2 meaning that the board is required to 
act in the best interest of the fund and its members. Section 7C(2)(a) of the PFA 
provides that 
 
in pursuing its object the board shall- take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
interests of members in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of this Act 
are protected at all times, … 
 
I will argue in this paper that the statutory obligation for the board to act in the best 
interest of the members does not in itself entail that the board is accountable to the 
                                                          

  Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae. LLB (WITS), LLM (NWU), LLM (WITS), Certificate in 
Advanced Broadcasting Law (Mandela Institute/WITS). Candidate Attorney, Benoni Justice 
Centre, Legal Aid South Africa, djdialogue@gmail.com. 
1  Mahlangu v Soweto City Council Pension Fund Case No PFA/GA/9384/2006/SM para 28, where 
it was held that "it is clear that a fund has fiduciary duties towards its members and beneficiaries. 
This fiduciary obligation arises from the fact that it is entrusted with the control of property with 
which it is bound to manage for the benefit of others". See also Isaacs v SAMA Pension Fund 
Case No PFA/WE/278/98/NJ para 13, where it was said that the board of trustees owes fiduciary 
duties to both the fund and its members.  See also Tex Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz 
1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) para 15 and Marais v Momentum Life Pension Fund Case No 
PFA/GA/1459/01/CN 2002 para 26, where the  adjudicator went as far as saying that the board 
must "…at all times act in the best interest of  the fund, its members and other beneficiaries. 
They are furthermore required to act impartially towards the various stakeholders in a fund". 
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members of the pension fund, nor does that entail that the board owes a fiduciary 
duty to the members of the fund. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that 
the board of trustees of a South African pension fund is accountable to and owes 
fiduciary duties only to the fund it serves and not to members of the fund. I will also 
argue that a fiduciary duty arises in the context of a fiduciary relationship, which 
relationship is based on the principle of loyalty. Furthermore, I will argue that at the 
very best the board owes a duty of good faith towards the members of the fund. This 
will be done by distinguishing the legal position relating to trust law from the law 
relating to retirement funds in South Africa. 
 
2 Best interest of members   
 
Most established employers set up retirement funds consisting of money contributed 
by them and their employees to provide pension fund benefits on retirement as part 
of those employees' employment benefits.3 These can be in the form of defined 
contribution schemes or defined benefit arrangements.4 The employer's retirement 
savings plan in the form of a retirement fund is an essential part of an employee's 
future financial security. However, the fact that the employer establishes or even 
negotiates a retirement fund does not entail that the employer administers and 
controls such a scheme.5 Once established, the retirement fund concerned must 
                                                          
3  Sanlam 2012 southafrica.smetoolkit.org. See also George Analysis of South African Pension 
Fund Conversions 6. 
4  See Registrar of Pension Funds v ICS Pension Fund 2010 ZASCA 63 para 14, where it was 
stated that "there are two kinds of pension funds (at least for present purposes). One is a 
'defined benefit fund'. In such a fund members become entitled to fixed benefits that are 
circumscribed by the rules, irrespective of the performance of the investments that are made by 
the fund. If the investments of the fund produce insufficient income to meet those obligations 
then the employer underwrites the shortfall. If the investments that are made by the fund perform 
better than expected a surplus will accrue to the fund. The other is a 'defined contribution fund'. 
In such a fund the benefits that are payable to members are directly linked to the performance of 
the investments that are made by the fund. If the investments perform well then the benefit will 
accrue to members directly and they will likewise bear the brunt of poor performance. Such a 
fund thus relieves the employer of the risk of poor performance of its investments and likewise 
promises to members the direct benefit of sound performance". 
5  Section 7C(1) Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956 (PFA) provides that "the object of a board shall be 
to direct, control and oversee the operations of a fund in accordance with the applicable laws and 
the rules of the fund". This essentially means that all of the stakeholders, including unions, 
members and employers, are enjoined to appreciate that retirement funds are separate and 
independent entities which ought to be managed and controlled independently by a board of 
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have an independent 'managing body' which will ensure that the fund operates 
smoothly and is able to achieve the aims and objectives for which it was created. In 
terms of section 7A of the Act 
 
…every fund shall have a board consisting of at least four board members, at least 
50% of whom the members of the fund shall have the right to elect.   
 
The board of trustees is the managing and controlling body of the fund and should 
operate independently of the employer, members and other stakeholders of the 
fund.6 The board of trustees should also carry out its duties as mandated by the 
rules of the fund and the Act. It has been argued – correctly in my view – that7: 
 
a retirement fund is not simply a vehicle through which an employer provides 
retirement benefits agreed with its employees. If that were the case, it would not be 
necessary to have trustees of the fund. 
 
The board of trustees is not constituted to rubber stamp the wishes of either the 
employer contributing to the fund or the members of the fund; it is also not obliged to 
act in accordance with such wishes. Instead, the board should be in a position to 
manage the affairs of the fund in a manner that advances the interests of the fund. 
  
The PFA requires the board in pursuing its objects to take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that the interests of members in terms of the rules of the fund and the 
provisions of this Act are protected at all times.8 I submit that this does not entail that 
the board has to go out of its way to seek to ensure that members' wishes are 
carried out, but merely to ensure that when it carries out its duties towards the fund, 
the members are not unjustly prejudiced. It has been argued, correctly in my view, 
that section 7C(2) of the PFA does not require the board to seek to advance the best 
interest of members but only to 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
trustees. When carrying out its duties the board of trustees should be able to implement the 
mandate of the fund free from the outside influence of other stakeholders of the fund.  
6  Section 7C(1) PFA provides that "the object of a board shall be to direct, control and oversee the 
operations of a fund in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the fund". 
7  Asher 2001 SAAJ 6. 
8  Section 7C(2)(a) PFA.  
MV MARUMOAGAE      PER / PELJ 2012(15)2 
 
557 / 569 
 
take all reasonable steps to protect the interest of members as reflected in terms of 
the rules of the fund and the provisions of the PFA.9 
 
Further, at the very least the board owes a duty of good faith towards the members 
and other stakeholders in the fund.10  
 
In ensuring that the board acts in good faith towards the members, the PFA 
mandates the board among other things to 
 
ensure that adequate and appropriate information is communicated to the members 
of the fund by informing them of their rights, benefits and duties in terms of the rules 
of the fund.11 
 
Information regarding the contribution of payments, the benefits payable, the fund's 
investment performance and the eligibility of certain benefits should as soon as 
practicable be made available to the members.12 This is in line with section 7D(c) of 
the PFA, which provides that 
 
the duties of a board shall be to ensure that adequate and appropriate information 
is communicated to the members of the fund informing them of their rights, benefits 
and duties in terms of the rules of the fund. 
 
In terms of the rules of the fund the board has a responsibility to ensure that benefits 
payable are paid promptly and timeously, unless there is a legitimate reason 
occasioning the delay or refusal to pay.  
 
It is important to point out that South African retirement funds in terms of section 
4B(1) of the PFA are juristic persons.13 In terms of section 5(1)(a) of the PFA, once 
registered a fund shall in so far as its activities are concerned, become a body 
corporate capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name and of doing all 
such things as may be necessary for or incidental to the exercise of its powers or the 
performance of its functions in terms of its rules. As such, the fund is capable of 
                                                          
9  Hunter 2000 www.hunterlaw.co.za 11.  
10  Hunter et al Pension Funds Act 171.  
11  Section 7D(c) PFA. 
12  Liberty Corporate 2009 www.libertycorporate.co.za. 
13  See also Vivian "South African Insurance Markets" 689.  
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acquiring its own legal identity through the registration of a set of rules under the 
PFA. Pension funds are capable of acquiring and owning their own assets as 
separate legal persons to the exclusion of all others.14 Contributions made by 
employers and employees for the future benefit of the members, once made, 
become assets of the fund and the members will be entitled to them only in 
accordance with the rules of the fund. 
 
The members can also forfeit such benefits if the prescribed time limits, procedures 
and formalities provided for in the rules of the fund are not adhered to.15 Therefore 
the members cannot dictate how the fund should be run in order to safeguard their 
interests. However, as stakeholders in the fund they need to be adequately informed 
about their benefits plan and how their investments are run by the board of trustees. 
They are entitled to be satisfied that the fund is being properly run and managed.16 
By so satisfying them the board of trustees would be acting in good faith towards 
them. 
 
The concept of 'fiduciary duty' has not been precisely defined in South Africa and 
has often 'wrongly' been used interchangeably with the concept of 'good faith' by our 
courts and academics.17 In her attempt to distinguish the said concepts, Hunter 
argues correctly in my view that:18 
                                                          
14  Andrews 2004 SAAJ 6.  
15  For instance contributions should be made regularly as provided for in the rules. As far as 
disability benefits are concerned, the prescribed procedures and time limits should be followed. 
Most pension funds rules provide the trustees with the discretion to decide whether a member is 
entitled to disability benefit or not. 
16  See UK Court of Appeal in McDonald v Horn 1995 1 All ER 961 (CA) as quoted in Hunter et al 
Pension Funds Act 165.  
17   Ferguson v Sapref Pension Fund Case No PFA/WE/673/99/SM para 9, where it was held that 
"The duty to act in good faith therefore does not equate to a duty to act reasonably …, and it is 
not a fiduciary duty…" The duty of the board of trustees to act in good faith towards stakeholders 
in the fund such as members emanates from s2(a) Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) 
Act 28 of 2001, which provides that "a director, member, partner, official, employee or agent of a 
financial institution or of a nominee company who invests, holds, keeps in safe custody, controls, 
administers or alienates any funds of the financial institution or any trust property- must, with 
regard to such funds, observe the utmost good faith and exercise proper care and diligence; …" 
In order to discharge its duty of good faith to the members of the fund, the board of trustees 
might among other things be required to provide members with information which is necessary to 
safeguard their interests in the fund. See Caffin v African Oxygen Limited Pension Fund Case No 
PFA/WE/14/98 & PFA/WE/26/98 para 14, where it was held that "it would seem to be just and 
equitable, therefore, that boards of trustees be obliged in terms of their duty to act in good faith to 
disclose such information as would reasonably enable members of pension funds to consider the 
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a duty of good faith requires its bearer to exercise its powers for the purposes for 
which they were conferred on it and not for any other purpose…. A fiduciary duty 
imposes upon its bearer a duty to act in the best interest of the person or persons to 
whom the duty is owed. 
 
The board of trustees demonstrates only good faith towards the members of the fund 
by keeping them informed of the interests they have in the fund and also by ensuring 
that members are not prejudiced when the board is performing its functions.  
 
3 The fiduciary duties of the board 
 
Common law fiduciary duties have been developed over time by our courts.19 There 
are also fiduciary duties which have been established through legislation.20 Fiduciary 
duties arise as a consequence of a fiduciary relationship existing between the board 
and the fund. The board of trustees occupies a fiduciary position and holds the 
assets of the fund in a fiduciary capacity.21 
 
The existence of such a duty and its nature and extent are questions of fact to be 
adduced from a thorough consideration of the substance of the relationship and any 
relevant circumstances which affect the operation of that relationship …22 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the concept of a fiduciary duty has proven to be 
somewhat challenging for South African courts and academics, a fact which has led 
to this concept being referred to as a concept with 'no clearly defined meaning'.23  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consequences that the information held for them in the realisation of their rights, interests and 
expectations. The failure to furnish such information, without appropriate justification, will 
constitute an improper exercise of the board's powers and will amount to maladministration of the 
fund as contemplated in the definition of a complaint in section 1 of the Pension Funds Act".   
18  Hunter 2000 www.hunterlaw.co.za fn  25. 
19  Ikard 2006 privateaudio.homestead.com para 2. See also Transvaal Cold Storage Co Ltd v 
Palmer 1904 TS 4, Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 2 1921 AD 168, Hofer v 
Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407B, Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA), 
Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 2009 6 SA 531 (SCA). 
20  See among others s 76 Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 9 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, s 
7C Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and s 2(a) Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 
2001.  
21  Du Toit 2007 Stell LR 471. 
22  Bellairs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A) 1130F. See also Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 
1 All SA 150 (SCA) para 27.  
23 Hofer v Kevitt 1996 2 SA 402 (C) 407B. See also Du Toit 2007 Stell LR 471. 
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For the purposes of this paper, fiduciary duties should be understood as the 
obligation and responsibility the board of trustees has to be loyal to the fund, and 
thereby to carry out its duties towards the fund with dignity and honesty in order to 
advance the objectives of the fund. It has been convincingly argued that:24 
 
the principal feature of a fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty by the fiduciary to his or 
her principal. This duty means that the fiduciary must act in utmost good faith and in 
accordance with the powers properly conferred on him or her, must exercise loyalty 
towards the fund, to the exclusion of all others…. 
 
I submit therefore that the boards of trustee of pension funds owe fiduciary duties 
only to the funds they serve and not to the members of such funds. They owe a duty 
of loyalty only to the fund to the exclusion of all other stakeholders of the fund, 
including the members of those funds.  
 
The board of trustees' fiduciary duties include among others the duty to exercise the 
ordinary skill, care, diligence and prudence necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the fund;25 the duty to perform the functions of the fund in such a way that all of the 
stakeholders of the fund are not prejudiced, especially members of the fund;26 the 
duty to be loyal only to the fund; the duty to preserve the assets of the fund and also 
to ensure that the information relating to the fund is kept confidential unless it is 
necessary to reveal such information; the duty to manage the fund effectively and 
efficiently by keeping accurate books and records; the duty to uphold and defend the 
fund and its assets as well as to carry out the obligations of the fund, such as paying 
benefits to members; the duty to avoid conflict of interest between the affairs  of 
individual members of the board  and  those of the fund; as well as the duty to utilise 
expertise outside the board in areas where the board lacks such expertise for the 
proper functioning of the fund.27  
 
                                                          
24  Hunter et al Pension Funds Act 172. 
25  Section 7C(2)(b) PFA. 
26  Section 7C(2)(a) PFA. 
27  Section 7C(2)(E) PFA. 
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It has been consistently stated in the South African retirement industry that the board 
of trustees is required to act in the best interests of the fund and its members; that it 
owes a fiduciary duty to both the fund and its members.28 Such a view by our courts 
is generally accepted as correct and its justification seems to be in section 7C(2)(a) 
of the PFA.29 It was held in Johannesburg Municipality Pension Fund v NCB 
Employee Benefits (Pty) Ltd30  that: 
 
what is plain from the provisions of the Act and a rule … is that the committee of the 
fund … occupies a position of trust. It has a fiduciary duty towards the members of 
the fund on whose behalf the assets of the pension funds are administered. 
 
Such a position emanates from the fact that initially retirement funds in South Africa 
were established as trusts. As a result the principles relating to trust law are applied 
as they are to retirement funds, without distinguishing between trust law and pension 
law. I am of the view that such an approach is wrong.  
 
It has been argued correctly in my view that:31 
 
many trust law principles cannot properly be applied to the relationship between 
boards and members of funds because trusts and retirement funds are 
fundamentally different. 
 
A trust has been defined as:32 
 
a legal institution in which a person, the trustee, subject to public supervision, holds 
or administers property separately from his or her own, for the benefit of another 
person or persons or for the furtherance of a charitable or other purpose. 
                                                          
28  See Tex Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) para 15. See also Cheadle, 
Thompson and Haysom Attorneys Date Unknown www.naledi.org.za para 18, where it is argued 
that "trustees are under a duty to utilise their powers for the benefit of and in the exclusive 
interest of the fund and its members. Whenever there is a divergence between the funds' 
interests and those of the service provider the legal duty of trustees is clear, they are obliged to 
act in the interests of the fund and its members". 
29  This section provides that "in pursuing its object the board shall- take all reasonable steps to  
ensure that the interests of members in terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of this 
Act are protected at all times …" 
30  Johannesburg Municipality Pension Fund v NCB Employee Benefits (Pty) Ltd (Unpublished 
case) Case No 74/01 as quoted in Hunter et al Pension Funds Act 161, as well as the list of 
cases referred to thereon.  
31  Hunter et al Pension Funds Act 163. 
32  Cameron et al South African Law of Trusts 1. 
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It is worth noting that under South African trust law, a trust is not a legal persona and 
the assets of the trust vest in its trustees in their capacities as trustees.33 Under 
South African law trusts do not have separate legal personality, save where a statute 
provides otherwise.34 
 
The essence of a trust is that the trustees hold the trust's assets on behalf of its 
beneficiaries or on behalf of some object (such as a charity).35 
 
This simply means that the trustee is not holding the assets of the trust for the 
benefit of the trust itself but to ensure that the beneficiaries of the trust benefit from 
the trust. The trustee performs his or her duties in relation to the trust in order for the 
beneficiary to benefit.  
 
This is in contrast to retirement funds, where trustees in the board of trustees 
perform their duties to enhance the performance of the fund and not to advance the 
wishes or interests of the members of the fund. As far as trusts are concerned, 
 
the trustee is appointed and accepts office to exercise fiduciary responsibility over 
property on behalf of and in the interests of another.36 
 
The trustee of a trust owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiary of the trust. The 'trust' 
trustee's fiduciary duty is inherent in the relationship between the grantor, trustee, 
and beneficiary, under this duty. A trustee is obliged to administer the trust solely in 
the interest of the trust's beneficiaries.  
 
Therefore it is imperative that the trustee must refrain from engaging in 'self-dealing' 
or anything that may be construed as an act that benefits the trustee in some way to 
the detriment of a trust beneficiary. 37 
 
                                                          
33  Van der Westhuizen v Van Sandwyk 1996 2 SA 490 (W) 495D.  
34  Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 10, where it was 
held that "except where statute provides otherwise, a trust is not a legal person…" as quoted in 
Hunter et al Pension Funds Act fn 118. 
35  Geach Trusts  61. 
36  Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) para 20.  
37  Edward Jones Trust Company 2008 www.edwardjones.com. 
MV MARUMOAGAE      PER / PELJ 2012(15)2 
 
563 / 569 
 
A trustee must generally speaking avoid as far as possible a conflict between her 
personal interests and those of the beneficiaries.38 
 
Having been entrusted with the duty of protecting the interest of the beneficiaries, the 
trustee is not supposed to make a secret profit at the beneficiaries' expense or to 
place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty to the 
beneficiaries.39 In Doyle v Board of Executors40 the court held that a trustee 
undoubtedly occupies a fiduciary office which imposes upon a trustee the duty of 
utmost good faith towards all beneficiaries, whether actual or potential. As far as 
trusts are concerned, the trustees owe fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
However, the position is different with regard to retirement funds, which possess 
independent legal personality under South African law, as shown above.  
 
As far as the fiduciary duties owed by the board of trustees to the fund are 
concerned, it has been correctly stated that "the applicable legal principles are the 
same as those which apply to directors of companies".41 In Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen42 the court held that 
 
the director's duty is to observe the utmost good faith towards the company, and in 
discharging that duty he is required to exercise an independent judgment and to 
take decisions according to the best interests of the company as his principal. 
 
It was also held in Boulting v Association of Cinematograph Television & Allied 
Technicians43 that: 
 
Or take a nominee director, that is, a director of a company who is nominated by a 
large shareholder to represent his interests. There is nothing wrong in it. It is done 
every day. Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the director is left free to exercise his 
best judgment in the interests of the company which he serves. But if he is put upon 
terms that he is bound to act in the affairs of the company in accordance with the 
directions of his patron, it is beyond doubt unlawful. 
 
                                                          
38  Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) para 16. 
39  Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 2 1921 AD 168 160e-i. 
40  Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 2 SA 805 (C) 813A-B. 
41  PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers 
Union 2007 ZAGPHC 146 para 25. 
42  Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 4 SA 156 (W) 163D-F. 
43  Boulting v Association of Cinematograph Television & Allied Technicians 1963 2 QB 606, 626.  
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The director of a company does not owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the 
company, nor is he or she obliged to be dictated to by their wishes. All that the 
director has to do is to utilise his talents to advance the interest of the company. The 
same applies to retirement funds. The board of trustees should seek to advance the 
objectives of the fund and not the interests of the members of the fund. The role of 
the directors of companies and the legal principles applicable thereto has been held 
to apply mutatis mutandis to the trustees of a pension fund.44 The essential 
requirement for the establishment of a fiduciary duty is that the trustees in the board 
of trustees must stand towards the fund in a position of confidence and utmost good 
faith.45 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
It cannot be disputed that the members of pension funds are amongst the major 
stakeholders in their respective funds and that they have interests vested therein. 
However, the board of trustees is not obliged to advance such interests. I submit that 
trade unions are in a better position to seek to advance members' interests.46 The 
board of trustees is accountable only to the fund and further owes fiduciary duties 
only to the fund it serves. It has been shown in this paper that as far as fiduciary 
duties are concerned, the principles of trust law are different from the principles of 
pensions law, and that it would not be ideal to apply such principles to pension 
funds; further, that the role of the board of trustees can be compared to that of the 
directors of companies. The pension fund itself is the owner of its assets, and its 
board members, like the directors of a company, must direct and control those 
assets in the interests of the pension fund.47 As far as trusts are concerned, it has 
been held that "the  relationship between a trustee, and for that matter a beneficiary 
of a trust, is therefore, more real and direct than would be the case between a 
director or shareholder of a company".48 This simply means that a trustee of a trust 
                                                          
44  PPWAWU National Provident Fund v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers 
Union 2007 ZAGPHC 146 para 27.  
45  Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 1 All SA 150 (SCA) 159e-g. 
46  Hunter et al Pension Funds Act 163. 
47  Hayton "Pension trustees" 1. 
48  Harris v Rees 2011 2 SA 294 (GSJ). 
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manages the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries, while on the other hand the 
director of the company manages the company for the benefit of the company. The 
latter position is also true for the board of trustees of pension funds, which manages 
the fund for the benefit only of the fund.  
 
A fiduciary duty is a very high duty of care and it involves a high degree of trust and 
honesty. The duty basically involves an obligation to care for the financial affairs or 
wellbeing of the fund. This is a duty which the board of trustees owes only to the 
fund. However, the board of trustees does owe a duty of good faith towards the 
members of the fund.  The duty of good faith means that the board of trustees should 
not without reasonable and proper cause conduct themselves in a manner calculated 
or likely to seriously prejudice the members of pension funds, for instance by making 
reckless investments leading to the fund's being unable to pay benefits to its 
members. The board of trustees should not act negligently when dealing with the 
affairs of the fund. The board needs to operate independently and lawfully within the 
boundaries of the rules of the fund and the PFA, even though at times it may 
exercise its discretion as outlined in the rules of the fund.  Being loyal to the fund and 
executing its duties efficiently and effectively will result in the board's benefiting the 
members of the fund. The members of the board are therefore required to act with 
due care and diligence, to avoid conflict of interest with the fund, and to act with 
impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries of the fund.49 
                                                          
49  Section 7C PFA. 
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